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(ii)

6

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONALD H. MEYERS, and ENGINEERING ENTERPRISES, INC.,
d/b/a INTERMOUNTAIN AERIAL
SURVEYS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

No. 17070

-vs.INTERWEST CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; SKYCHOPPERS
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation;
and SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO,
a Colorado corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Defendant/Appellant Skychoppers of Colorado feels compelled
to file this Reply Brief because of various misstatements, irregularities and improprieties incorporated in plaintiffs' responsive
brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

Re Respondents' Statement of Facts.

On page 2, plaintiffs

state that "Several negotiations were undertaken between the parties
and Complaints were finally filed on August 7, 1978."

Plaintiffs

make no citation to the record to support the statement that "several
negotiations were undertaken between the parties", and, in fact,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

an examination of the record on appeal will reveal no affidavit,
exhibit or testimony of any kind which would place this alleged
fact in the record.

Making such a statement that settlement

negotiations were ever undertaken is a flagrant attempt to create
a factual issue on appeal where no such fact was ever introduced
before the trial court.

Defendant trusts that the impropriety

of such a practice is so obvious and well understood that citation
of authority regarding the same is not necessary.
II.
Point I).

Re Respondents' Argument to Amend Sununons (under
The simple answer to plaintiffs' argument of this point

is that this Court has heretofore stated what errors in process
are mere irregularities", e.g., failing to name a guardian ad
litem, Ballard v. Buist, 8 Utah 2d. 308, 333 P.2d 1071 (1959)
and those which are "jurisdictional", e.g., improper designation
of statutory period for making appearance, Martin v. Nelson, 533
P.2d 897 (Utah 1975) or failing to endorse the date of service
on the copy of the summons served, Reese v. Scott, 8 Utah 2d. 134,
329 P.2d 877 (1958).

Plaintiffs' argument in effect is suggesting

that this Court now change the rule it has heretofore established
by making a defect which has previously been held to be jurisdictional to now be only a mere irregularity.

Such a vacillation

of law would not be in the best interests of maintaining a
reasonably consistent and predictable jurisprudence in the State
of Utah.
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III.
Point I) .

Re Respondents' Abuse of Discretion Argument (under
Plaintiffs argue that a trial court ruling on a dis-

cretionary matter should not be reversed unless it is found to
be clearly arbitrary.

Such is admittedly the rule with respect

to a trial court's ruling on a matter in which it is to decide
what is "just and proper under the circumstances", sometimes
referred to as "judicial discretion.''

Whereas, "abuse of discre-

tion" means that such discretion has not been lawfully exercised.
See State ex rel Nielsen v. Superior Court for Thurston County,
110 P.2d 645 (Wash. 1941); Nix v. State, 213 So.2d 554 (Miss.
1968).
A trial court has no discretion to alter statutory provisions, court rules or prior pronouncements of this Court regarding
jurisdictional requirements.

VJhen a trial court makes such an

error in law, it is also referred to as an "abuse of discretion,"
but since it involves an error in law rather than an equitable
evaluation of facts and circumstances, the court has no discretion.
In Medina v. The District Court for the County of Otero,
493 P.2d 367 (Colo. 1972), the Court in discussing "abuse of
discretion" observed:
"The latter phrase has been given such
varied interpretations we deem it
necessary to clarify our view of the
lower court's action and we follow the
persuasive rationale in Eager v.
Derowitsch, 78 Wyo. 251, 232 P.2d 713
(1951) dealing with the expressing
'abuse of discretion'. The Wyoming
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Court said, quoting from Barrett v.
Board River Power Co., 146 S.C. 85,
143 S.E. 650, as follows:
'We are sure that in many
instances, in the years gone
by, the rulings of presiding
judges, in matters where they
are given a right to exercise
their discretion, were not
interferred with because of
the old unfortunate statement
to the effect that it must be
shown that there was an 'abuse
of discretion.' Recently it
has been shown time after time
that the term 'abuse of discretion' does not mean any
reflection upon the presiding
judge, and it is a strict legal
term, to indicate that the
appellate court is simply of
the opinion that there was
cormnission of an error of law
in the circumstances.'"
(Emphasis added.)
In Brown v. Beck, 169 P.2d 855 (Ariz. 1946), the Court
noted:
"The word 'abuse of discretion' as used
in many cases in reference to the action
of the trial court is defined as, in the
case of Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v.
Foster, 170 S.C. 121, 169 S.E. 871, 'The
term 'abuse of discretion' does not mean
any reflection on the presiding judge
and does not carry with it an implication
of conduct deserving censure, but is
strictly a legal term indicating that
the appellate court is of the opinion
that under the circumstances the trial
judge committed error of law in the
exercise of his discretion. ' 1 Words
and Phrases, Perm.Ed., 182."

And, as stated in Beck v. Wingsfield, Inc., 122 F.2d 114 (3rd
Cir. 1941),
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" . . . action that would be necessary in
ordinary affairs to make one guilty of
an abuse connotes conduct of a different
grade than what is meant when a court is
said to have abused its discretion. Abuse
of discretion in law means that the
court's action was in error as a matter of
law. And where such abuse exists, reversal
will be ordered. See Cervin v. W. T. Grant
Co., 5 Cir., 100 F.2d 153, 155, 156."
To the same effect, see Macauley v. Query, 7 S.E.2d 519 (S.C. 1940);
Wood v. Waggoner, 293 N.W. 188 (S.D.

1940); Detroit Fidelity &

Surety Co. v. Foster, 169 S.E. 871 (S.C.
167 S.E. 665 (S.C.

1933); Paine v. Cohen,

1933); and Tunstal v. Learner Shops, 159 S.E.

386 (S.C. 1931)·. This Court also acknowledged in State v. Draper, 27 P.2d
39, 50 (Utah 1933), that abuse of discretion includes the commission
of an error of law by the trial court in stating:
"It does not imply intentional wrong or
bad faith or misconduct, nor any reflection on the judge. Root v. Bingham, 26
S.D. 118, 128 N.W. 132; State v. Dist.
Court, 213 Iowa, 822, 238 N.W. 290, 80
A.L.R. 339. It is a legal term to
indicate that the appellate court is
of the opinion that there was conunission
of error of law in the circumstances.
Bishop v. Bishop, 164 S.C. 493, 162 S.E.
756. It is an improvident exercise of
discretion; an error of law. Quinn v.
Gardiner (C.C.A.) 32 F. (2d) 772; Bringhurst v. Harkins, 2 W.W. Harr. (Del.)
324, 122 A. 783. A discretion exercise
to an end and purpose not justified by
and clearly against reason and evidence.
1 C.J. 372."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the case at bar, the trial court failed to follow the
21
statutory edict 1 / and prior pronouncements of this Court.
The
failure to designate the proper statutory period for making an
appearance in a sunnnons served upon a nonresident defendant has
been held by this Court to constitute a jurisdictional defect.
The trial court conunitted an error of law on a ooint
of law in
"'
which it had no discretion, and, therefore, it must be reversed.
IV.

Re Respondents' Argument that Process Served was

Merely Irregular and not Void (under Point II).

Under this point,

respondents merely note as stated in 62 Am.Jur.Zd, Process §14
that some jurisdictions hold that a defect in the stated time
for return in a summons is fatal, while others hold that it is
an irregularity which may be amended.

Respondents then cite

some cases from jurisdictions permitting amendment.

Such argument

ignores the fact that Utah is aligned with those states holding
such a defect to be jurisdictional, particularly where the effect
of the defect is to shorten a statutorily provided period, as
noted in respondents' quote from 62 Am.Jur.2d, Process §14, supra:
"It seems generally agreed that a Summons
which is returnable in fewer than the
number of da s rovided b statute will
on Motion.
Emp asis added.)
Respondents cite no reasons why Utah should now change its
recent (1975) pronouncement 21 that a sununons was defective for two

--

l/Section 78-27-27, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
Z/Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975).
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reasons, the second being "and because the summons served on the
California defendant required answering within 20 rather than 30
days."

Appellant submits that in the absence of some compelling

reason to change a well-recognized and recently announced principle
of law, the same should not be changed.
V.

Re Respondents' Waiver Argument (under Point II).

Respondents on page 10 of their brief make the statement that:
"This case, however, is a case which involves
a defendant who has participated in settlement negotiations for a period of time in
excess of 20 months, . . . This additionally
involves a case in which the defendant has now
chosen to appear only after 20 months to quash
the service originally considered by all parties
to be valid."
This is a flagrant and, in appellant's judgment, a censurable misstatement of the record.

There is no evidence in the record that

this defendant ever, a fortiori over a 20 month period, participated
in any settlement negotiations.
Respondents also on page 10 of their brief infer that
appellant (defendant Skychoppers of Colorado) is at fault in this
matter by
"

. . inducing an adverse party's inaction
to their detriment.
If plaintiffs had not
been induced into inaction on the complaint,

"
Again, there is not a single document or other item of evidence
introduced before the trial court to support the contention that
the appellant did anything to induce the respondents into inaction.
Such a statement is a bald-faced misrepresentation of the record
in this matter.
Respondents did not even allege, vis-a-vis introduce evidence,
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before the trial court that appellant induced respondents into
inaction in this matter.

The relevant allegations on this

point are contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of respondents'/plaintif
Motion for Leave to Amend Process (R. 16) which allege:
"2. Service of process was made on
15, 1978; and plaintiffs since that
have extended to defendants through
insurer time within which to answer
that no answer would be required so
as negotiations for settlement were

August
time
its
in
long
pending.

3.
Plaintiffs have to this point in time
never demanded that their Complaint be
answered, nor have they ever asserted a
right to nor attempted to have a default
entered against any of the defendants in
this action."
It is clear from the record that respondents have never
claimed that appellant, Skychoppers of Colorado, has done anything
to induce respondents to do, or not to do anything in this case.
As a matter of fact, respondents/plaintiffs never made a
settlement offer in this matter, either before or after the
complaint was filed.

Respondents pointed out on page 12 of its

brief that it is impossible to cite a negative fact in the
record, but challenged plaintiffs to acknowledge that the record
was devoid of any off er of settlement having been made either
during the four-year period between the time of the accident and
when suit was commenced, or during the 20-month period after the
suit was filed until appellant moved to quash the summons.

As

noted above, respondents make the irresponsible statement under
their STATEMENT OF FACTS that "Several negotiations were undertaket
between the parties . . . ", but failed to cite any evidence in the
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record to support such a statement.

Appellant contends that there

is no such evidence in the record and if such fact had existed,
certainly such evidence would have been introduced by plaintiff sf
respondents before the trial court by way of documents or affidavit
of someone having such knowledge.
As noted above, before the trial court the plaintiffs
alleged only that they had indicated to defendant that no answer
would be required so long as negotiations for settlement were
pending.

Plaintiffs did not allege that settlement negotiations

had ever cotnr.lenced.

As the record shows, the plaintiffs did not

file their complaint until the day before the statute of limitations ran on the cause of action alleged and then ignored their
lawsuit.

This defendant likewise ignored the lawsuit until it

made the motion to quash which is the subject of this appeal.
Plaintiffs now claim that they were misled by the defendant, who
did only that which the plaintiffs did, to-wit:

ignore plaintiffs'

lawsuit for 20 months.
After making the erroneous and unsupported statements that
defendant induced plaintiffs into inaction, plaintiffs state on
page 11 of their brief that:
"However, a closer investigation indicates
that the defendant's failure to make a
timely Motion has caused the waiver of its
rights to claim that the irregularities
render the service of process void."
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There is no evidence in the record that defendant ever
did anything from which it could be inferred that it waived
its right to challenge any service made upon it.

It is horn-

book law that a person alleging waiver must show an intentional,
voluntary relinquishment of a known right by the party against
whom the waiver is alleged.

As stated in 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel

and Waiver §154, p.836:
"A waiver, according to the generally
accepted definition, is the voluntary
and intentional relinquishment of a
known right, claim or privilege. It
has also been defined as the intentional
surrender of a known right or privilege,
such surrender modifying other existing
rights or privileges, or varying the
terms of a contract. Waiver is a
voluntary act and implies election by
a person to dispense with something of
value or to forego some right or advantage which he might at his option have
demanded and insisted upon. * * *"
Since plaintiffs admit they never demanded a response
to the service of process made upon this defendant, no duty to

act thereon arose, and since the record discloses no act or
omission which would indicate an intentional, voluntary relinquishment of the right to challenge any process served upon it,
this defendant cannot now be held to have waived the right to
challenge the sufficiency of the process served upon it.
Also, with respect to plaintiffs' contention that defendants'
motion was not timely filed, it should be noted "timeliness'' is
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a concept which must interact with duty to act, or in fact action
which has been taken that may create an estoppel.

Plaintiffs

cite Miller v. Ziegler, 3 Utah 17, 5 Pac. 518 (1881) on the
timeliness issue.

However, the case is clearly not applicable

to the fact situation of the case at bar since in Miller the
defendant sat quietly by while a judgment was taken against him
and then sought reversal on appeal.

The Court noted that the

defendant could not "sit quietly by and seek judgment against
him by default . . . " (emphasis added).

In the case at bar,

the defendant has sought nothing from the plaintiffs and the
plaintiffs have done nothing and, therefore, there is no conduct
on the part of the defendant of which they can complain.
Likewise, Thomas v. District Court of Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake County, 171 P.2d 667 (Utah 1946)
cited by plaintiffs is not helpful in resolving the issues of
the case at bar.

In fact, the case strongly supports defendant's

position that a surranons which incorrectly designates the time in
which to appear is defective.

In Thomas, supra, at 668, it is

stated:
"It would seem that such defects in the
return of service, which could properly
have been amended had application therefor
been made, are not as vital as is the
endorsement of time of service upon the
summons, because the endorsement of the
date of service is in effect a part of
the summons as fixing the time in which
defendant must appear. Dolan v. Jones,
37 Wash. 176 79 P. 640. Williams v.
'
Pittock, 35 Wash.
271, 77 P. 38 5 . "
(Emphasis added.)
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The fixing of time in which to appear is affected by two
elements, the date of service which must be endorsed upon the
summons and the period of time stated within the summons when
an appearance must be made.

If there is an error or omission

in either element, the summons is then defective because it does
not correctly advise the defendant of the time in which he must
appear.
Also, from a full reading of Thomas, supra, it is clear
that the "timeliness" requirement referred to is that the motion
and special appearance to attack jurisdiction must be made before
the defendant appears generally and defends on the merits.

The

Court quoted with approval at page 669 its prior decision in
Glassmann v. District Court, 80 Utah 1, 12 P.2d 361 (1932), wherern
it held:
"We have no hesitation in saying that the
court erred in overruling the motion to
dismiss the writ. If the defendant had
appeared and pleaded without first interposing the motion, the case would be
entirely different but such was not the
fact, and his motion was well taken."
The requirement that a timely motion to quash must be made specially
before appearing generally was again stated by the Utah Court in
the recent case of Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975) when
the Court observed:
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"Service of process here was defective, not
only because of the false return, but because
it required answer in 20 days instead of 30
days. Such service is jurisdictional.
Defendant, as was his right, apgeared
specially and raised the point.'
(Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, defendant's motion to quash was timely
not only in the sense that a special appearance for that purpose
was made before defendant filed a general answer and defended on
the merits, but defendant responded to the service made upon it
before it was ever required to do so.

As plaintiffs admit, at

the time of service they indicated no response would be required
at that time and have never since required a response.

It is

difficult to understand how plaintiffs can contend defendant's
motion was not timely when plaintiffs, by their own conduct, gave
an open extension of time in which to respond and never up to the
time that the motion was filed, demanded a response.

It was the

plaintiffs, not the defendant, who by their voluntary, intentional
acts, waived the right to demand a "more timely" response to
their service of process than that which they in fact received.
VI.

Re Respondents' Argument that Appellant was not

Misled or Disadvantaged by the Trial Court's Denial of its
Motion to Quash.

Again, under this point, respondents engage

in the flagrant practice of stating facts not found in the
record.

They state, at page 14:
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"All parties consider the process to be
proper and sufficient and had through
mutual agreement, contemplating settlement,
not required the defendant Skychoppers of
Colorado to answer or otherwise plead."
There is absolutely nothing in the record to support the contention
that defendant ever considered the process to be proper.

Defendant

was told it need not respond to the process and it did not.

Nothi~

more is shown, or can be inferred from the record.
Since the complaint was filed the last day before the
statute of limitations ran, another complaint could not have been
filed or served on the defendant, and since a summons must issue
for service within three months from date the complaint is filed,
a proper summons could not have been issued after the 9lst day
after the complaint was filed.

The trial court by now, more than

20 months after the summons was served, permitting the summons
so served to be amended has, in effect, extended the statute of
limitations against the defendant in this action by the 20 month
period in question.
As stated in appellant's brief, "it is difficult to conceive
of a more prejudicial situation than having a statute of limitation period extended after it has run."

Respondents surely must

jest when they state in their brief, p. 14:
"The question left begging in these circumstances is just exactly how the defendant
Skychoppers of Colorado was disadvantaged
in these circumstances where no action
toward default was every taken."
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Finally, respondents contend that appellant has not shown
that it was in some way misled by the defective service.
contention is immaterial.

Such

This Court in the 1946 case of Thomas

v. District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, supra, observed that the trial court there, apparently as
the trial court in the case at bar, takes the position that the
plaintiff must allege and show that he was misled by the defect.
This Court, in answer to such contention, stated:
" . . . Such is not the provision of the statute.
And we find no well reasoned, adjudicated case,
holding that where service is attacked by
motion before pleading or judgment, a trial
court can inquire into the question of being
misled. That would be strictly judicial
legislation. In L.R.A. 1917C, 148. That
case lays down the rule:
'It is the general
rule, that, if a statute prescribes a method
for serving process, the method must be
followed. '
" . . The burden of the annotation is
that the theory of some cases holding
that the defendant must show he has been
misled is unsound and is summarized in
this statement: 'It is sufficient to say
of them that they are utterly contrary
to the modern American notions of the
power and purposes of a court of justice
. . . Indeed, apart from purely clerical
errors or blemishes or defects in immaterial matters, the courts have no
right to enter into the question of
whether or not in their opinion the party
was misled.' The annotation is commended
to the reader."
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And, again in 1958, this Court in Rees v. Scott, 8 Utah 2d. 134,
329 P.2d 877, quashed a service of summons where the surmnons was
not properly endorsed by the serving officer, and in so doing,
stated:
"We see no merit in the contention that
the defendant has the burden to allege
and prove that he was misled by the
defect. The trial court properly
granted the motion to quash."
CONCLUSION
The arguments raised in the BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
are fallacious and specious, being based on allegations of fact
not supported by the record and on legal authorities which are
contrary to specific holdings of this Court.
As discussed under the points of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
the trial court, in excess of its jurisdiction, has attempted to
extradict the plaintiffs from the painful position in which they
now find themselves, but for which they alone are responsible.
While such an effort may seem conunendable, it cannot be condoned
when it abridges the rights of the defendant to challenge the
sufficiency of the process served upon him.
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WHEREFORE, the defendant Skychoppers of Colorado respectfully
prays that the orders of the trial court be reversed and that the
summons which was served upon this defendant be quashed and
deemed null and void.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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day of January, 1981.
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